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Trib-u-la-tion; n: distress or suffering resulting from op-
pression, persecution or affliction also: a trying experi-
ence.*
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I. INTRODUCTION
A child's testimony may provide some therapeutic value for
the child,1 but, at the same time it is unquestionably traumatic for a
child. The vast majority of the literature on this subject is in the
context of child abuse or other criminal actions. Very little has
been said to guide the civil trial lawyer in dealing with the child
witness. The psychological harm to a child testifying in a tort ac-
t The author is a partner with the law firm of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ci-
resi in the Minneapolis, Minnesota, office. He specializes in plaintiff's medical
negligence, product liability, and personal injury.
* WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw IlERNATIoNAL DICrIoNARY 2441 (1993).
1. See, e.g., Desmond K. Runyan et al., Impact of Legal Intervention on Sexually
Abused Children, 113J. PEDIATRICS 647-48 (1988). Dr. Runyan argues that the op-
portunity for a child victim to tell a court about abusive acts may be empowering.
See id. Dr. Runyan also advocates that the legal interview may also serve as a pub-
lic affirmation that the child was not responsible for the events which transpired
and may thus minimize self blame. See id.
2. See NANCY W. PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS 155
(2d ed. 1991); see alsoJacqueline Y. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court
a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 643, 647-48, 656 (1981-82).
1
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tion, however, is comparable to that suffered by a child who testi-
fies against a criminal defendant.3 Witnessing the death or injury
of a loved one by a tortfeasor is essentially the same as witnessing a
violent crime. In both cases, a testifying child is required to relive a
devastatingly unpleasant experience. This is particularly true for
young children who may lack the ability to repress traumatic
events, as compared to adolescents and adults who unconsciously
5repress such events.
Thus, it is pertinent to ask, should a child client testify? Is it an
option to have the child testify? If so, under what conditions?
What deference should be given to a child client's wishes? What
steps can be taken to reduce the potential trauma to the child? Do
alternatives exist to the child's live testimony?
II. To TESTIFY OR NOT TO TESTIFY, THAT IS THE QUESTION
The following hypothetical illustrates the dilemma in many
cases where a child witness may testify: A mother and father drive
their eight-year-old boy, Mario, to a hockey game. A truck runs a
red light and crashes into the side of the car. Mario breaks his fe-
mur and his father suffers a significant head injury. Mario tearfully
testifies at his deposition that he saw the truck coming at the last
second and tells how he crawled over the seat after the crash to try
to "wake up" his dad, "but, he wouldn't wake up." It is likely that
Mario's testimony would compel the jury to award significantly
higher damages than without his testimony. It is also clear, how-
3. See Parker, supra note 2, at 656. Parker notes that children are often
called upon as witnesses in civil cases. Even testifying in non-violent cases such as
divorce cases poses a possible mental health risk to the child involved. See id. at
661. During the trial, a child witness may find some protection in the form of a
sensitive, thoughtful judge. See id. at 648. Nonetheless, the child still goes unpro-
tected during pre-trial. See id. Children can be further protected, however,
through the assignment of Child Hearing Officer at the early stages of an investi-
gation. See id. at 654.
4. See id. at 646. Studies involving child witnesses, specifically child sexual
abuse witnesses, demonstrate that the testimonial situation is made more complex
because the child most likely knows the offender. See id. These same studies have
shown "that the child suffers more severe psychological damage from testifying
against a person he knows than against a stranger." Id.
5. See Lenore C. Terr, The Child as a Witness, in CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 207, 213 (1980). Children lack the ability to employ the defense of "denial"
during a trauma. See id. Even though the child may not understand who did it, or
in what order it occurred, all the incidents are remembered. See id. Children do
not typically suffer from amnesia after trauma. This generally makes them better
witnesses than adults who often "employ massive denial when traumatized." Id.
[Vol. 24
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ever, that retelling the story is a terrible experience for Mario. This
observation is borne out by Mario's psychologist. In fact, Mario
states: "I never want to talk about it again." Unfortunately trial is
set to begin in two weeks. What should be done? How should the
parents (or the guardian ad litem6) represent Mario's best interests
(e.g., maximize his recovery of damages to provide for his future)?
A. Obeying the Child
It is questionable whether counsel is permitted to have Mario
testify at trial. Although Mario is only eight years old, he is the at-
torney's client, even if his parents retained the counsel for him,
and he has essentially instructed counsel not to call him as a wit-
ness.7 In determining whether counsel should respect the wishes of
Mario, or proceed with the child's testimony, rule 1.14(a) of the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct (identical to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct) provide some guidance. Specifi-
cally the rule reads:
When a client's ability to make adequately considered de-
cisions in connection with the representation is impaired,
6. While the child is on the stand, the trial court judge is the primary de-
fender of the child's best interest. In protecting those interests, it is the duty of
the trial court judge to: "(1) select a competent person to serve as guardian ad
litem; (2) select a person with no adverse interests to the minor; and (3) to insure
that the person so selected is adequately instructed on the proper performance of
his or her duties." Shainwald v. Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (S.C. Ct. App.
1990) (citing S.C. R. Civ. PRO. 17(d) requirements for qualifications of guardian
ad litem). Generally, it is recognized that the guardian ad litem's responsibility is
to advocate for the child's best interests, not for the child's contrary stated opin-
ions. See id. See also Proposed Standards for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse
and Neglect Cases, 29 FAM. L.Q. 376 (Fall 1995). In this proposal, a guardian ad
litem is defined as an officer of the court appointed to protect the child's interests
"without being bound by the child's expressed preferences." Id. (emphasis added). The
comment further suggests that the child's advocate, while not bound to follow any
express preference, should take into consideration the child's opinion in deter-
mining what those best interests are. See id. at 377.
7. Most authorities recognize that an attorney-client relationship is estab-
lished with the child, carrying with it the commensurate responsibilities associated
with clients. See Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So. 2d 626, 634 (Miss. 1987)
(establishing attorney-client relationship where a child sued his attorney for legal
malpractice based on the mishandling of a medical negligence case); see also Cook
v. Connolly, 366 N.W.2d 287, 288 (Minn. 1985) (demonstrating manifestation of
attorney-client relationship between child and lawyer); Provencal v. Provencal,
451 A.2d 374, 376 (N.H. 1982) (finding attorney-client relationship existing be-
tween child and attorney guardian ad litem); In re Angelina, 622 N.Y.S.2d 336, 337
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whether because of minority, mental disability or for some
other reason, the lawyer shall, as reasonably possible, maintain
a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client."
The phrase, "as reasonably possible" appears to provide the
trial lawyer with significant discretion in deciding whether to call
the child to testify at trial. But, consider a New Jersey court's def-
erence to the wishes of a client with the mental capacity of a child
six-to-eight years of age9 in In re M.R 1° This case involved the cus-
tody of a 21-year-old woman with Down's Syndrome who had an IQ
comparable to that of a six-to-eight year old child." A psychologist
opined that M.R. was capable of understanding and expressing the
choice of where she wanted to live.' 2 M.R. wished to live with her
father. 3 M.R.'s lawyer submitted a report to the court arguing that
great deference should be given to M.R.'s choice. During oral ar-
gument, however, her appointed counsel acknowledged that both
the father's and mother's homes would serve M.R.'s interests.
4
The trial court, finding that among other things, both parent's
homes provided a "loving environment," awarded custody to M.R.'s
mother.
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (1987) (emphasis
added); accord MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.14
(1997).
9. See In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1276 (N.J. 1994). In this case, the NewJer-
sey Supreme Court held that the trial court should have placed the burden of
proving the woman's specific incapacity on the mother challenging the woman's
capacity. See id. The court further held that the primary duty of counsel for de-
velopmentally disabled persons is to protect that person's rights. See id.
10. See id. at 1285. The court, noting comments made regarding Rule 1.14 of
the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, determined that a developmentally
disabled client could participate in legal decision-making with proper advice and
assistance from counsel.
11. See id. at 1276. M.R. functioned educationally at a second or third grade
level, and was not considered capable of making logical adult choices. See id. at
1276-77.
12. See id. at 1276. After interviewing M.R., Dr. Deborah Dawson with the
Guardianship Evaluation Project of the Center for Applied Psychology at Rutgers
University, determined "[t]he choice of where to live is [a] very specific [one] ...
that [M.R.] is able to understand." Id.
13. See id. at 1278. M.R. felt, as did her psychologist, that living with her fa-
ther would allow her more freedom. Dr. Dawson stated M.R. would suffer a
.significant blow" to her self esteem should her choice be denied. Id.
14. See id. at 1283. While differing in their methods, each parent recognized
M.R.'s interest in becoming more independent. M.R.'s father allowed for greater
social interaction and involvement. M.R.'s mother balanced personal freedom
with rules and structure. See id. at 1279.
15. See id. at 1278. The trial court found M.R. associated her mother's home
with school, work and rules, while she associated her father's home with "happier
[Vol. 24
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In appealing his case to the NewJersey Supreme Court, M.R.'s
father argued that his daughters attorney breached standards of
professional conduct by failing to zealously advocate his client's po-
sition.16 The court, agreeing with the father, focused on the dis-
tinctions between the roles and duties of an appointed counsel and
those of a guardian ad litem ("GAL"). The court recognized that
the attorney and the GAL frequently differ on their position as to
the incompetent's preferences or interests, their approaches by
which they forward those preferences or interests, and finally, in
their method of carrying out the incompetent's preferences or in-
18terests.
An attorney representing a disabled person should maintain
"as much as possible, a normal attorney-client relationship with
that person." Continuing to define the attorney's role in relation
to an incompetent or minor and identifying the problems associ-
ated in mixing a "best interest determination" with that role, the
times" such as "boys, babies and boyfriends." Id. In awarding guardianship of
M.R. to her mother, the trial court determined that her father had failed to meet
the burden of showing that "M.R. had the specific capacity to express" whom she
wished to live with. Id. The NewJersey Supreme Court, in reversing in part and
remanding in part the lower court's decision, found that the trial court had erred
by placing the burden on M.R.'s father. See id. at 1280. Instead, the court deter-
mined that "M.R.'s mother will bear the burden of proving by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that M.R. is not competent to make that choice." Id. at 1282.
16. See id. at 1282. The court attempted to answer whether an "appointed
counsel for an incompetent is to zealously advocate the incompetent's position or
simply to inform the court of counsel's perception of the incompetent's best in-
terests." Id.
17. See id. at 1283. The role of a court appointed counsel is to provide serv-
ices to the child in the form of legal advocacy. The role of a court appointed
guardian ad litem is to provide services to the court in the form of independent
fact finding and investigation as to what is in the child's best interest. See id.
18. See id. at 1284. Two New Jersey state judiciary committee reports found
great differences in the roles provided to an incompetent or minor by an attorney
as opposed to a guardian ad litem. Major differences included: an attorney repre-
sents the incompetent's wishes, where the guardian ad litem forwards the incom-
petent's best interests; where a representing attorney works and communicates
through other counsel, a guardian ad litem may communicate directly through
parties; and where an attorney must be a zealous advocate, the guardian ad litem
merely files a report with the court outlining his or her findings regarding the in-
competent's best interests. See id.
19. Id. This notion is fostered by the MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rules 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, which provides that the lawyer is not to deter-
mine whether the client is competent to make a decision, but to advocate the de-
cision that the client makes. That role, however, does not extend to advocating
decisions that are patently absurd or that pose an undue risk of harm to the cli-
ent. See id. at 1284-85.
1998]
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court stated:
Advocacy diluted by excessive concern for the client's best
interests would raise troubling questions for lawyers in the
adversarial system. If a lawyer determines that the client
needs help in determining action in the client's best in-
terests, the lawyer is more likely to provide only proce-
dural formality rather than vigorous representation. The
lawyer who undertakes to act according to the best inter-
est standard may be forced to make decisions concerning
the client's mental capacity that the lawyer is unqualified
to make.2 °
Not every court agrees with the New Jersey court's decision.
For example, in In rej.P.B., the Iowa Supreme Court took a differ-
ent and troubling view of the attorney-child client relationship.
21
In J.P.B., a mother, A.B., lost custody of her two children, J.B. and
C.B., because of continuing concerns ranging from "housekeeping,
hygiene, child supervision, and confused generational boundaries,
to substantiated allegations of incest and other sexual abuse."
22
The mother, herself, had been a victim of her father's sexual
abuse. 23 At a hearing to decide whether the parent-child relation-
ship between A.B. and her children should be terminated, a single
20. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, A Critique and A
Proposal for Reform, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 599, 635 (1981). Frolik argues that an attor-
ney, attempting to act "according to the best interest standard may be forced to
make decisions concerning the client's mental capacity that the attorney is un-
qualified to make." Id. at 635. Several jurisdictions, in situations involving in-
competents, minors and wards, have held that the appointed attorney should
zealously advocate the client's wishes. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389
(M.D. Ala. 1974) (stating wards have the right to receive traditional adversarial
representation from counsel); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (finding constitutional requirement of representative counsel not satis-
fied by appointment of guardian ad litem); In re Link, 713 S.W.2d 487, 496 (Mo.
1986) (holding appointed counsel must "act as an advocate" for proposed ward).
21. See In reJ.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Iowa 1988) (holding that dual rep-
resentation of the two children, only one of whom favored termination of the
mother's parental rights, was not a conflict of interest preventing the attorney
from seeking the best interests of the children).
22. See id. at 389. Allegations of sexual abuse included abuse of one of the
children, C.B., by one of the mother's boyfriends. See id. The other child, J.B.,
described himself as an "unwitting participant in a variety of sexual acts" with his
mother and other relatives to "which he referred to as 'the game.'" Id.
23. See id. The mother, A.B. had a history of "incestuous behavior" with her
father and other family members. The trial court examined "overwhelming" evi-
dence manifesting A.B.'s unwillingness or inability to "separate herself and the
children from the influence of a family plagued by a history of incestuous behav-
ior," despite extensive professional counseling. Id.
[Vol. 24
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court-appointed counsel represented both children.14 J.B. wanted
the relationship terminated, while C.B. did not. Likewise, A.B. did
not wish to see her parent-child relationship terminated 5  Both
children testified at the hearing. Based on the evidence presented,
the juvenile court found that neither child could be safely returned
to their mother's custody.
26
In specifically discussing the relationship between a court ap-
pointed attorney and a child, the court stated:
We are mindful that in the ordinary lawyer-client relation-
ship, the lawyer's role is not to determine the client's inter-
est but to advocate the client's interest .... Such a duty
may present an ethical dilemma in a juvenile proceeding
where the objective is always the best interests of the child,
not the child's personal objective. We are aware that the
unsettled law in this area offers no clear direction to an at-
torney faced with such a predicament. 2
The American Bar Association (ABA) and the Institute for Ju-
dicial Administration (IJA), however, have rejected the position
that a child's attorney should act "in the child's best interests.",
2
The ABA/IJA standards state that "where the juvenile is capable of
considered judgment on his or her own behalf, the determination
of the client's interest in the proceedings should ultimately remain
the client's responsibility."2
24. See id. at 388-89. The juvenile court judge appointed an attorney for
A.B., and an attorney forJ.B. and C.B., as well as a guardian ad litem forJ.B. and
C.B. See id. at 388-89.
25. See id. at 388. The appellants did not claim that the evidence presented
was insufficient to support the termination decree. The sole claim on appeal was
the conflict of interest inherent in the attorney's representation of the children's
opposing interests at trial. In short, the only issue before the court was whether
the State could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children could
not be returned to their mother's custody without suffering harm. See id.
26. See id. at 391. The undisputed allegations of continuing sexual abuse by
J.B. drove the decision that the children could not be safely returned to their
mother. See id.
27. Id. (citing Horowitz & Davidson, Tough Decisions for the Tender Years, 10
FAM. ADvoc. 9 (Winter 1988). The Iowa court also discussed a similar issue de-
cided by the Montana Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79, 80
(Mont. 1985). The Ro/fe Court, analyzing an attorney's role in regard to their
child clients in divorce cases, stated, " ... given the immaturity of the client.., it
is this Court's opinion that the best interests of the child, the paramount con-
cern .... is best served by modifying the traditional lawyer-client relationship." Id.
28. See IJA/ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT § 3.1, at 77 (1979)
(defining the nature of the attorney-client relationship and the client's interests).
29. Id. The standard in cases involving child incompetence allows an attorney
to work with the child client to help determine the child's best interests. See id. at
1998]
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Many commentators agree that child clients are owed the
same duties as their adult counterparts, and that their wishes and
preferences should be followed.30 At least one author, Mark Soler,
believes child clients should receive the same professional treat-
ment as adult clients.3' Soler states:
[I]f the child's attorney does not advocate the child's po-
sition as the child sees it, the child really has no independ-
ent voice. Ultimately, it is the court that is charged with
determining the child's best interests, and attorneys qua
attorneys have no greater experience than anybody else to
make an independent decision about what is best for the
child. An attorney arguing in opposition to the position
expressed by his or her client acts contrary to the tradi-
tional foundational duties defining the attorney-client re-
lationship. In what sense does the attorney represent the
child if he or she does not represent what the child ex-• 32
pressly wants?
The American Bar Association Family Law Section clearly de-
fines the child's attorney as "a lawyer who provides legal services
for a child and who owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, con-
fidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is due an
adult client."3 Most commentators also agree, however, that the
uniform standards in place today for attorneys representing chil-
dren are woefully inadequate. The complexity of the issues in-
81. See also Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers who represent Children in Abuse
and Neglect Cases, 29 FAM. L.Q. 376 (Fall 1995):
The child's attorney should decide whether to call the child as a witness.
The decision should include consideration of the child's need or desire
to testify, any repercussions of testifying, the necessity of the child's di-
rect testimony, the availability of other evidence or hearsay exceptions
which may be substituted for direct testimony and withstand possible
cross-examination. Ultimately, the child's attorney is bound by the child's direc-
tion concerning testifying.
(emphasis added.)
30. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
31. See MARK SOLER, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 12 (1987).
32. Id.
33. Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers who represent Children in Abuse and
Neglect Cases, supra note 29, at 378. The drafters comment that a child is a sepa-
rate individual with potentially discrete and independent views, and that the at-
torney must advocate the child's independent articulated position. See id.
34. See, e.g., Ann M. Haralambie, The Role of the Child's Attorney in Protecting the
Child Throughout the Litigation Process, 71 N.D. L. REV. 939, 944-47 (1995). Hara-
lambie states that while the ABA/IJA proposed standards for child advocacy, "do a
good job and should be adopted," they are not appropriate for all children. She
opines that child advocates should receive "specialized multi-disciplinary training"
[Vol. 24
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volved with child clients and witnesses make the creation of any
single standard a difficult task. 5
So what is a child's lawyer to do regarding child testimony?
Practically speaking, even without Rule 1.14, it may be nearly im-
possible to get the child to testify against his or her wishes. As with
any client, counsel can try to convince the child to testify. Such a
course of action, however, should be given careful consideration,
as an attorney may be seen as an authority figure to a child, and
may be able to wield greater persuasive powers than the attorney
could with an adult client. Also, even if the child is willing to tes-
tify, some studies suggest that jurors do not believe that children
testify accurately.
which would "equip those attorneys with the responsibility of exercising increased
discretion." Id. at 944-45.
35. See id. at 944-47; see also DONALD N. BERSOFF, CHILDREN AS PARTICIPANTS IN
PSYCHOEDUCATION ASSESSMENT: CHILDREN'S COMPETENCY TO CONSENT 170 (2d ed.
1983) (discussing a child's capacity to make independent decisions); DAVID L.
KERNS, THE PEDIATRIC PERSPECTIVE: FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD ADVoCACY 23 (3d ed.
1987) (analyzing the relationship between a child's age and his or her ability to
make rational judgments).
36. See Proposed Standards for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect
Cases, supra note 29, at 378. The drafters note that "the child's attorney should
recognize that the child may be more susceptible to intimidation and manipula-
tion than some adult clients." Id.
37. See Gail S. Goodman, et al., When a Child Takes the Stand, 11 LAw & HUM.
BEHAv. 27 (1987). Goodman's group, citing multiple factors (increasing crimes
against children, increasing crimes which children might witness, increasing like-
lihood that prosecutors will use a child as a key witness and an increase in state
legislatures accommodating child witnesses) predicts an increase in the numbers
of child witnesses. See id. at 28; see also M. A. STRAUS, ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 78 (1984); D. WHITCOMB, ET AL., WHEN
THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE 94 (1985); J. BULKEY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PAPERS FROM A
NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFoRMs IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 17-
18 (1985). Some studies have shown that less than 50% of any group asked be-
lieves that a child witness would respond accurately. It is believed that these views
are based on the perception that child witnesses exhibit many of the characteris-
tics that lower a witnesses' credibility (e.g. powerless speech style, low status, and
lack of confidence). See Goodman, supra, at 28; see also K. A. Deffenbacher, Eye-
witness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their Relationship ?, LAW
& HUM. BEHAv. 4, 243-260 (1980); B. Erickson, et al., Speech Style and Impression
Formation in a Court Setting: The Effects of "Powerful" and "Powerless" Speech, J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1.4, 266-279 (1978). Goodman's study demonstrates
that a child witness' credibility increases when testifying to a jury. Moreover,
when a 6-to-10-year-old testifies, the statements of other adult witnesses who also
testify increases in importance. See Goodman, supra, at 31-32, 35. See also Good-
man, Jurors'Reaction to Child Witnesses, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 139, 142 (1984) (asserting
studies supporting the conclusion that jurors view children as less credible wit-
nesses than adults). But cf. supra note 5.
19981
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III. IS THE CHILD COMPETENT TO TESTIFY?
Contrary to Mr. Wigmore and Mr. McCormick's suggestion
that any child should be able to testify, a witness, regardless of
age, must be "competent" to testify. 3 According to Minnesota
Statutes section 595.02, age alone does not determine competency.
The statute states:
A child under ten years of age is a competent witness un-
less the court finds that the child lacks the capacity to re-
member or relate truthfully the facts respecting which the
child is examined. A child describing any act or event
may use language appropriate for a child of that age.40
Consequently, even a five-year-old child may be competent to tes-
tify.
41
In State v. Lau, the Minnesota Court of Appeals was asked to
review a' trial court's findings regarding the credibility and suffi-
ciency of a five-year-old's testimony. The child, R.D., told her
mother that her neighbor had sexually abused her. R.D. subse-
quently repeated her story to a social worker, the police, a psy-
43chologist, and an attorney. At trial, the state produced a psy-
chologist who testified that a young child such as R.D. is capable of
accurately reporting sexual abuse. The defense's psychological ex-
pert stated that R.D. was incapable of testifying, but admitted that
he "did not believe a child cannot tell the truth in the sense of ac-
38. See 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 509 (1979) (determining children should
be allowed as witnesses). See also McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §§ 62, 140 (1972).
McCormick finds no specific rule excluding a child of any particular age from tes-
tifying. Rather, the test is whether the witness has the intelligence to make a
worthwhile witness and whether the witness can testify truthfully. See id.
39. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1 (1996) (requiring a "sufficient under-
standing" from every person qualified to testify).
40. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1(m) (1996); see also State v. Mosby, 450
N.W.2d 629, 633-35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (finding a ten-year-old child capable of
answering the prosecution's questions adequately); State v. Morrison, 437 N.W.2d
422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing five-year-old to testify as a witness).
41. See, e.g., State v. Lau, 409 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see gen-
erally, Annotation, Competency of Young Child as a Witness in a Civil Case, 81
A.L.R.2d 386 (1962).
42. See Lau, 409 N.W.2d at 276. The child, who went to her neighbor's trailer
to bring him some candy, returned to her mother's house and described how the
neighbor had touched her, took her pants down, and licked her "pee pee."
43. See id. At one of the later interviews, R.D. maintained a consistent story,
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curately describing events."44 The judge, who conducted an in-
camera interview with R.D. to determine competence, allowed R.D.
to testify. The neighbor was convicted of sexual abuse in the sec-
ond degree.45 Upon appellate review, it was determined that R.D.
"was able to understand the oath .... capable of narrating the facts
to which her testimony related... demonstrated an ability to recall
and relate facts... and understood the difference between the
truth and a lie."46
While a basic understanding of child development aids in de-
termining a child's competency to testify,47 more sophisticated
measures are required for the direct examination of a young child.
Such an examination should begin with a brief line of questioning
to convince the judge and jury that the child is competent to testify
(and to preempt any attempt by opposing counsel to interrupt the
direct examination by requesting to voir dire the child on the issue
of competency).4
44. Id. at 276, 277. The defense expert, concerned that R.D. had low cogni-
tive ability, was interviewed improperly in front of too many adults and a had
prior knowledge of sexual abuse, believed R.D. was incapable of testifying truth-
fully. See id. at 277.
45. See Lau, 409 N.W.2d at 276. The appellate court, affirming the lower
court's findings, found that R.D.'s testimony was corroborated by her prior state-
ments and by her appearance at the interview immediately following the incident.
See id.
46. Id. The appellate court, holding that competency determinations are
within the determination of the trial court, found no abuse of that discretion. See
id. at 278.
47. A good analysis of child development and trial testimony can be found in
Barry Nurcombe, The Child as a Witness: Competency and Credibility, J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD PSYcH. 473 (1986).
48. SeeJohn R. Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy and
the Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705, 715-720 (1987). Histori-
cally, child witness competency was determined by the child's ability to swear to
and understand the witness' oath. The modem approach relies on a four-part
test, including: 1) capacity to accurately perceive and record events; 2) personal
knowledge of the event to be testified to; 3) an express understanding of the dif-
ference between the truth and a lie and the duty to tell the truth; and 4) the abil-
ity to express thoughts clearly and understandably. See id. See also Gail S. Good-
man, Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 9, 12-13; Robin
W. Morey, Comment, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse:
Must We Abandon It?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 245, 247, 251 (1985). A brief line of
questioning to show competence can be as simple as:
1. What is your name?
2. How old are you?
3. Do you go to school? Where? What grade are you in?
4. Do you have a mom and dad? Do you have any sisters or brothers?
5. Will you tell a true story or a wrong story today?
1998]
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Ultimately, the decision whether a child is competent to testify
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. In Minnesota,
when the child witness' competency to testify is in question, the
judge may allow the child's statements into the record if she be-
lieves the child's testimony is credible and reliable. 5° In these cases,
it is better for the court to give the child the benefit of doubt, and
"err on the side of determining the child to be competent" to tes-
51tify as a witness.
IV. PREPARING THE CHILD TO MEET DARTH VADER
Much of a child's fear and apprehension of live trial testimony
may stem from the child's misperception about what really goes on
at trial. Television dramas portraying attorneys' vituperative dia-
tribes and abrasive cross-examinations may play some role in strik-
ing terror in the hearts of witnesses of all ages, particularly chil-
dren. Even if a child has not developed such fears from television,
a courtroom filled with strangers is intimidating. For example, be-
cause of the judge's black robe, the child may believe that the
judge is Darth Vader or the Wicked Witch of the West. 52 A child
may even believe that going to court means the same as going to
jail.
6. If you told a wrong story, do you know what would happen?
See generally Christiansen, supra, at 715-720.
49. See State v. Norgaard, 272 Minn. 48, 136 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1965) (finding
the trial court is in the best position to determine whether a child of tender years
is capable of reciting the facts and relating them truthfully).
50. See State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 659-62 (Minn. 1990). Lanam in-
volved the sexual abuse of a three-year-old girl. The child made spontaneous
statements regarding the abuse, and when questioned, consistently described the
abuse and the abuser. At trial, the child was declared incompetent to testify, but
her statements were admitted under MINN. STAT. § 595.02 subd. (3). See id. at 657-
58. In Minnesota, even though a child witness is deemed incompetent to testify,
the trial court may allow into evidence the child's out of court statement if it is
credible.
51. See id. at 660 (finding that while it is the jury's province to sort out incon-
sistencies and determine credibility, it is the court's province to determine com-
petency).
52. See State v. Phelps, 696 P.2d 447, 453 (Mont. 1985). In Phelps, a five-
year-old boy testified against a man who allegedly sexually abused him. See id.
During his testimony, the child stated he thought he was in a police station and
that the judge, who was wearing a robe, was a karate expert. See id. In reviewing
the case, the Montana Supreme Court held that inconsistencies in the child's per-
ception of where he was at the time of testimony did not affect his competency as
a witness. See id. The child's competence, rather, "is determined by capacity of
expression and appreciation of the duty to tell the truth." Id.
[Vol, 24
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If a child is called as a witness, it is imperative that counsel
adequately prepare the child to testify. Studies show that properly
preparing a child and providing adequate support during the ex-
perience can reduce the trauma of a trial.53 This preparation can
be done by first explaining to the child the purpose of the testi-
mony. The child should know that the jury, six people from the
community, are chosen to decide what is fair, and that they need to
know the truth about what happened and how it has changed the
child's family. To adequately prepare, counsel should conduct a
mock direct examination. Furthermore, to ensure competent rep-
resentation, counsel should have an understanding of the funda-
54mental characteristics of children.
Young, preschool-aged children, typically three-to-six years
old, often present special problems in terms of their communica-
tion and comprehension ability.55 Children this age also tend to
use and interpret language very literally56 and do not handle ab-
stractions well.57 Similarly, school-aged children (those roughly
seven-to-ten years old), while possessed of their own unique charac-
53. See Nancy M. P. King, et al., Going to Court: The Experience of Child Victims
ofIntrafamilial Sexual Abuse, 13J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y& L., 705, 712-14 (1988).
54. See ANNE GRAFFAM WALKER, HANDBOOK ON QUESTIONING CHILDREN: A
LINGUISTIC PERSPECrIVE 13 (2d ed. 1994) (providing a detailed and thorough
analysis of the characteristics of children and offering linguistic advice for com-
municating with young children).
55. See id.
56. See id. A typical example: Asked if she could "read" an eye chart, the child
responded, "No! It doesn't make words." Id.
57. See id. With regard to abstract thought, preschoolers are ill-equipped to
discuss the difference between truth and lies. See id. Such children do better with
concrete examples that ask them to demonstrate rather than articulate their aware-
ness. See id. (emphasis added). Further, pre-schoolers may lack the ability to col-
lect information into specific categories. See id. This makes it difficult for such
children to respond to questions that ask them if "anything like this" happened
before. See id. Children this age tend to use words representative of time, dis-
tance, kinship and size, long before they understand their meaning. See id. Pre-
schoolers generally do not organize events in their minds in an adult way, often
leaving out relevant settings, descriptions, chronology, and motivations in relating
past events. See id. Young children also often tend to supply an answer to every
question even if they have no knowledge of its answer. See id. One reason for this
behavior is that from an early age, children are taught that questions and answers
form an indivisible pair. See id. If a question is left unanswered, children perceive
something to be wrong. See id. Children usually answer questions with "Yes" for a
number of reasons. Children understand that "Yes" is a valued answer that indi-
cates cooperation. They often perceive it to be the answer that the adult wants,
particularly in response to a tag question in which the tag is negative (e.g., "You
like it, don't you?"). Id.
1998]
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58
teristics, generally, also have difficulty handling abstract concepts.
Further, school-aged children may still have difficulty processing
complex questions and complex verb phrases. 59 Children this age
will generally have problems with passives, the difference between
"ask" and "tell," pronoun reference and complex negation. 60
Adolescent children, ages eleven to eighteen, represent a dis-
tinct group that has their own individual characteristics relating to
their ability to testify. While older, these children may not neces-
sarily possess developed narrative or spatial skills. In fact, chil-
dren at this age who are under-educated, under-parented or unat-
62tached may remain in the school-age stage.
When preparing to use a child as a witness, it is important to
use simple words and sentence structure. During mock direct ex-
63amination, employ simple, common, everyday words and phrases.
In addition, counsel should make a conscious effort to use ques-
tions and comments that keep the number of ideas to a mini-
mum.64 Moreover, the examiner should phrase questions positively
65and avoid negatives whenever possible.
Because children often believe that they should have an an-
swer to every question, counsel must give particular attention to
58. See id.
59. See WALKER, supra note 54, at 13. Complex verb phrases may include, for
instance, the past perfect tense, e.g., "Where was this supposed to have happened?"
Id.
60. See id. Multiple negatives such as "You don't deny you did it, do you?" will
likely confuse the child and elicit an inappropriate answer. Id. Furthermore,
school- aged children may have difficulty organizing the details of narratives, will
be unequipped to deal with adult insincerity such as sarcasm and irony, and may
still believe that adults in general speak the truth. See id.
61. See id. Adolescents may not understand time as both a historical and as a
day-to-day concept that affects their lives. See id. at 28.
62. See id. at 29. Other possible difficulties that could impair an adolescent's
ability to testify include: difficulty with complex negation; confusion created by
linguistic ambiguity such as is found in newspaper headlines, some ads, meta-
phors, idioms, proverbs, and jokes; or, confusion created by long, complex ques-
tions. See id
63. See id. Words and phrases such as "attorney," "court," "deny,"
"subsequent," "take the witness stand," and the like do not fall into that category.
64. See id. at 31. The younger the child, the smaller the number of ideas that
should be expressed. In addition, limiting questions with one focus is also pre-
ferred. See id.
65. See id. at 17. It is also helpful to state names and places rather than their
corresponding pronouns. Ask, "What did Albert say?" instead of "What did he say?"
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whether the child actually understands the question.6 The child
should be instructed to tell the judge if he or she doesn't under-
stand a question. It may be a good idea for an attorney to ask a
child a few convoluted questions during preparation to verify that
the child understands this instruction.
Equally important to the mental preparation for cross exami-
nation is actual practice. To familiarize the child with a cross ex-
amination by opposing counsel, attorneys should ask a colleague
with whom the child is not familiar to conduct a cross examination.
Next, call the judge's clerk and make arrangements for a
courtroom tour at least a week before trial. Have the child sit in
the witness chair and if possible, conduct a brief mock direct ex-
amination from the location where you will question the child at
trial. Also conduct a cross-examination from the possible location
where opposing counsel may sit or stand during questioning.
If possible, introduce the child to courtroom personnel. Ide-
ally, meet the judge without the robe. If the judge is willing, have
the judge sit on the bench in robe while the child is seated on the
witness stand. Introduce the child to the judge's clerk and to the
court reporter.
If the child has a mental health counselor or other such spe-
cialist, that person may be able to provide the attorney with helpful
advice on how to minimize trauma to the child and how to effec-
tively present the child's testimony. Also, attempt to avoid snack or
nap times when calling the child to testify, and be prepared to take
frequent breaks during the testimony.
If the child is still fearful of taking the stand, the attorney
should ask the judge to allow the child to testify while seated on the
lap of, or next to, a trusted adult. Several courts have allowed chil-
dren to testify while seated on the lap of a family member 67 or at-
torney.68 In addition, permitting the child to take a blanket, stuffed
66. Debra Whitcomb, Child Victims as Witnesses, in EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT
CENTER 28 (1994). It is important to help the child identify and cope with ques-
tions they may not understand. See id. (citing K. SAYWITz AND L. SNYDER, IMPROVING
CHILDREN'sTESrIMONY WITH PREPARATION 111 (2d ed. 1992)).
67. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
68. State v. Rogers, 692 P.2d 2, 5 (Mont. 1984). Rogers involved the physical
and sexual abuse of a two-year-old girl. The child's four-year-old sister was found
competent to testify to the facts surrounding the abuse. Further, the sister dem-
onstrated to the court her ability to distinguish between the truth and a lie and
the importance of speaking the truth in court. See id. at 3-4.
The defendant, having been convicted of felony assault and sexual inter-
course without consent, "complained that allowing the sister to sit on the prose-
1998]
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animal, or toy to the stand may make the child more comfortable. 69
Consider, however, whether the use of such a support item will dis-
tract the jury. Never forget that thorough and adequate prepara-
tion are essential prerequisites for reducing a child's trauma and
for effective child testimony.
V. PRESENTING THE CHILD'S "TESTIMONY" WITHOUT CALLING THE
CHILD TO TESTIFY
A child's testimony can be presented in ways other than live
trial testimony. Despite a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confront a witness,7 ° courts have exercised their discretion
to accommodate a child's fear of the courtroom.7 ' For example,
judges have allowed a child to testify by closed circuit television. 72
cuting attorney's lap while testifying was prejudicial." Specifically, the defendant
argued "that it prevented [his defense attorney] from conducting an adequate
cross-examination." Id. at 5. In affirming the conviction, the Rogers court stated
that the defendant had not specifically established from the record that he was
denied any right, or prejudiced in any manner. Furthermore, the Court found
that, under Rule 611 of the MONT. R. EvID., the mode, order and control of any
interrogation or examination was within the discretion of the trial court. Addi-
tionally, the trial court judge correctly determined that allowing the sister to tes-
tify from the lap of the prosecuting attorney "assisted in directing her attention to
the questioning" and "provided comfort to her during a difficult and unfamiliar
experience." Id. See also Crocca, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Third
Party Accompanying or Rendering Support to Witness During Testimony, 82 A.L.R. 1038
(1990).
69. See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 535 N.E.2d 193, 205-207 (Mass. 1989)
(allowing a child witness in a sexual abuse case to testify from a child-sized table
and chair, sit near a parent, and bring a toy into the court room).
70. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and then be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added). The underlying policy behind the
Sixth Amendment is "the right physically to face those who testify against the ac-
cused and the right to conduct cross-examination." Cory v. Iowa, 478 U.S.1012,
1017 (1988). Likewise, "it intends to ensure the integrity of the fact finding proc-
ess." Kentuckyv. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987).
71. See State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 659-60 (Minn. 1990) (finding young
child witness not competent to testify but ruling her prior made statements were
reliable and allowing them into the record); State v. Peterson, 530 N.W.2d 843,
844 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (protecting a child witness from the trauma of a face-
to-face confrontation at trial by allowing the child to testify on videotape).
72. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-50 (1990) (holding a defendant's
(Vol. 24
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Because civil defendants do not enjoy the same constitutional pro-
tection as do criminal defendants, courts have been even more will-
ing to accommodate a child's testimony.
7
1
A good example of accommodating a child's testimony is
found in In re Brock.74 Brock sadly involves the tragic tale of a father
sexually abusing his two young daughters. The children were re-
moved from their parent's custody and placed in foster care.76
During the child protective hearings, the father's attorney was not
allowed to cross-examine the children, who's testimony was pre-
sented by videotaped deposition. 7 The court, citing the possible
additional trauma the children might suffer by testifying by per-
sonal appearance, overruled the father's objections regarding his
inability to cross-examine the children.7
right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-
face confrontation at trial only where the denial of such confrontation is necessary
to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testi-
mony is otherwise assured). See also Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 660; Peterson, 530
N.W.2d at 844 (citing Minnesota's adoption of Craig and protecting child wit-
nesses through various methods of testimony).
73. See In re Adoption ofJ.S.P.L, J.J.L, & J.W.L. v. Wessman, 532 N.W.2d 653,
661 (N.D. 1995) (finding incarcerated father had no absolute constitutional right
to personally confront and cross-examine witnesses at proceeding to terminate
parental rights and grant adoption petition); In re Brock, 499 N.W.2d 752, 757
(Mich. 1993) (holding rules applicable in a child protective proceeding differ
substantially from those applicable in a criminal case); State v. Naucke, 829
S.W.2d 445, 450 (Mo. 1992) (determining testimony by personal appearance
would cause the child to experience trauma, the court permitted an in camera
videotaped recording of the child's deposition out of defendant's presence as a
substitute).
74. 499 N.W.2d 752 (Mich. 1993).
75. See id. at 754. "Soft signs" of sexual abuse were first noticed by a neighbor
and later by the Michigan Department of Social Services. Blood was found on the
children's bed sheets. In addition, one child exhibited a red and swollen vagina
and complained that her private parts hurt. Finally, one child spontaneously
stated "Daddy put his finger in my pookey," referring to her vaginal and rectal ar-
eas. Id
76. See id. at 755. After the children were temporarily placed in foster care,
the adjudicative phase of the child protective hearing determined that the pro-
bate court had jurisdiction over the matter. Having found jurisdiction, the pro-
bate court determined the children should continue in foster care pending the
termination of the dispositional phase. See id.
77. See id. The child implicated her father during the videotaped deposition.
The videotape was shown to thejury. See id.
78. See id. at 755-56. During a special hearing regarding the older child's tes-
timony, a clinical expert testified that the child, if made to testify by personal ap-
pearance, would suffer additional trauma which would complicate and detract
from the child's psychological treatment. Specifically, the expert stated that the
physical aspects of the court room, the number of adults present at the hearings
1998]
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Showing a day-in-the-life video of the child also can be far
more compelling than having the injured child testify. Such videos
are generally admissible.79 In my experience, the most successful
day-in-the-life videos are those which are shorter than 15 minutes
and are filmed with little, if any, editing.
If the child has a guardian ad litem, consider calling that per-
son as a witness.8° The guardian ad litem cannot only testify as to
his or her observations of the child, but also to the guardian's duty,
by virtue of court appointment, to properly invest and spend any
money recovered by a child. This may allay any concerns the jury
may have as to whether the child's parents would be free to spend
the child's money without limitation.
8 '
Certain evidentiary rules may also allow the attorney to convey• 82
the child's story to the jury without having the child testify. For
and the vocabulary used would all detract or prevent the child from testifying per-
sonally. See id. The expert also stated that confronting her parents and being
asked questions during cross-examination would be traumatic and interfere with
the child's treatment. See id. at 755.
79. See Hahn v. Tri-Line Farmers Coop., 478 N.W.2d 515, 524-25 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (finding the admissibility of a "day in the life" videotape was within the
broad discretion of the trial court); see alsoJohnson v. Engen, 386 N.W.2d 269,
270-71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding a videotape is inadmissible if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues, or misleading nature).
80. In my experience, no defendant has objected to calling the guardian ad
litem as a witness. However, the defendant could possibly object by claiming that
the guardian is not the actual party to the action. See In re Cochems' Estate, 242
P.2d 56, 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (finding that a guardian ad litem is not a party to
an action, but merely a personal representative of record, against which a judg-
ment may not be rendered for or against); Cozine v. Bonnick, 245 S.W.2d 935
(Ky. 1952) (recognizing a guardian ad litem is merely an agent of the child and
court, not an actual party to the action). See also Borowski v. Sargent, 188 Minn.
102, 246 N.W. 540, 542 (1933) (child's action should be in the child's name "by
the guardian," rather than in the name of the guardian on the child's behalf); see
also MmNN. R. CIv. P. 17.01 (requiring that every action brought shall be in the
name of the real party in interest); MINN R. Civ. P. 17.02 (allowing a duly ap-
pointed representative to sue or defend on behalf of an infant or incompetent
persons). In addition, a guardian ad litem's adverse admissions may not bind the
child or waive the child's substantial rights. See State v. Larkin, 110 F.2d 226, 227
(8th Cir. 1940).
81. If the child does have a guardian ad litem, and prevails at trial, counsel
should also be aware of the taxation of costs implications with respect to the
guardian. See DuPont v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 771 F.2d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 1985)
(finding a guardian ad litem is an officer of the court appointed to serve the best
interests of the child, and as an officer of the court, the expenses of a guardian ad
litem are properly taxable as costs).
82. See MrNN. R. EvID. 803. The relevant portion of the rule states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the de-
[Vol. 24
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss1/2
CHILD WITNESSES
example, the child may have told a mental health care professional
about the horror of an injury. While such testimony from the
health care provider may be inadmissible hearsay as to the truth of
what the child observed, it may be admissible on the issue of the
83child's state of mind, 4 or as a statement for purposes of medical di-
agnosis or treatment.8 At least one judge believes that a child's
statements to a parent should be admitted because such statements
are essentially the same as those made to a health care provider for
purposes of diagnosis and treatment.85 Likewise, a child's docu-
mented statements to health care providers may be admissible as
statements in records of regularly conducted business activity.86 A
clarant is available as a witness:
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condi-
tion made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition.
(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A state-
ment of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation,
or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feel-
ing, pain, and bodily health) ....
(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. State-
ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describ-
ing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
MINN. R. EVD. 803, subd. (2)-(4).
83. See MINN. R. EVID. 803(3). Rule 803(3) combines two important excep-
tions, state of mind and statement of present bodily condition, to the general
hearsay rule. If statements regarding state of mind are to be considered admissi-
ble, the rule requires that state of mind be relevant to the issues in the lawsuit.
State of mind may also be admitted to prove that the declarant subsequently acted
in conformity with his state of mind. See Scott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 203 Minn.
547, 552, 282 N.W 467, 470 (1938) (admitting prior statement to show conformity
with state of mind).
84. See State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 122 (Minn. 1991) (holding trial
court properly admitted four-year-old child's statements to physician's assistant,
child protection specialist, and psychologist under MINN. R. EviD., 803(4)); see also
State v. Serna, 290 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Minn. 1980).
85. See BILLIE WRIGHT DzIECH & JUDGE CHARLES B. SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL:
AMERICA'S COURTS AND THEIR TREATMENT OF SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 140-47
(1989).
86. See MINN. R. EviD. 803(6). The rule states:
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity. A memorandum,
report, record, or date compilation, in any form, of acts, events, condi-
tions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from in-
formation transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course
of a regularly conducted business activity to make the memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
19981
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child's statement "under the stress of excitement" caused by an
event may likewise be admissible as a hearsay exception. If the
court believes that statements which would be admissible under
one of the hearsay exceptions are untrustworthy, however, such
statements may nonetheless be excluded.8
VI. CONCLUSION
Preventing or minimizing the trauma often associated with a
child witness testifying requires counsel to take additional measures
in preparing for trial. After making the initial decision to have a
child testify, counsel must carefully prepare and guide the child
through direct and cross examination and should examine other
alternatives to live testimony. Failure to consider such matters
could result in the child suffering unnecessary trauma, and in the
final analysis give less effective testimony.
ness....
MINN. R. OF EvID. 803 (6). See In re D.J.N., D.L.N., D.C.R., C.M.R., D.L.R. &
D.R.R., 568 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding child protection and
adoption files admissible under rule 803(6) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence);
In re Martine, 458 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding medical rec-
ords admissible under business records exception to hearsay rule).
87. See MINN. R. EviD. 803(2). In order to qualify as an exited utterance
three requirements must be met: 1) there must be a startling event or condition;
2) the statement must relate to the startling event or condition; and 3) the declar-
ant must be under a sufficient aura of excitement caused by the event or condi-
tion to ensure the trustworthiness of the statement. See id. See also In re Chues-
berg, 233 N.W.2d 887 (1975) (demonstrating that an excited utterance is not
rendered inadmissible because it is an answer to a question). Chuesberg involved a
young child witnessing the murder of his mother. See id. When asked who had
committed the murder, the child stated "Jimmy did it" and "Jimmy stepped on my
ma's face." See id. at 888. The trial court admitted the child's testimony under
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court later
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